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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 02/02/2008

Accident number: 547

Accident time: 11:05

Accident Date: 22/08/2006

Where it occurred: Task # 709, Nr Paktia
Kot, Ward 12, Central
District, Kabul
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: OPS-27/412-06

Date of main report: 28/09/2006
Name of source: UNMACA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty
grass/grazing area
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 02/02/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: WGS 84

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: E 069 20 24

Map north: N 34 32 50

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate area marking (?)
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
pressure to work quickly (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text
in [ ] is editorial.

Cover letter
To: Chief of OPS/DPM, UNMACA
From: Area Manager UNAMAC Kabul
Date: 28 Sep 2006
Subject: Investigation Report
Attached please find investigation report along with its supporting documents of Demining
Accident (CA-85) happened on [The victim] deminer of ATC MCT-09 at MF 709 in Pulicharkhi
area of Kabul City on 22 Aug 2006. [Name removed] QM Assistant and [Name removed] OPS
Associate for AMAC. Kabul carried out the investigation.
Findings and recommendations are mentioned in this report, forwarded for your information
and further action.

Demining Investigation Report
Date of incident/accident: 22-08-06, 11:05 hrs
Date of report: 28 Sep 2006
Place of accident: Nr Paktia Kot, Ward 12, Central District, Kabul Province
GR: WGS 84; E 069 20 24: N 34 32 50: GPS
Device that caused the incident/accident: PMN AP blast
Area was cleared in 2001 by [same demining agency].
History of the Minefield:
MF# 01/0101/012/709 is located at Pule Charkhi village, ward-12 of Kabul city. This is part of
impact survey ID-1088, SHA- 4, which has been reported by ALIS as low impacted
community then confirmed by LIAT as medium impacted due to recent victims. Type of land
of this MF is grazing. On 1981, this area was contaminated, at first time, by the Russian
forces in order to make secure the bunker 22 located here from penetration of the then anti
government forces and established an Anti personnel Mine belt around the bunkers. MF# 709
covers a part of this belt. ATC MCT-14 on 30 Sep 2001 completed clearance of this MF. As
soon as clearance of this area completed it was the end stage of Taliban regime and during
take over of Kabul city by northern alliance this area was re-mined by military forces through
re-establishing this belt by planting AP mines, installing concrete pillars attached with barbed
wires to prevent penetration of local people. Due to mine accidents on a civilian and two
animals in year 2005, which was investigated by AMAC and found that this area is
contaminated by mines need resurvey and clearance. Therefore, resurvey was conducted
immediately. Then, on 15 Aug 2006, due to request of WSP for construction of Kabul-Surobi
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highway, which a portion of this MF covers their requested area was started by ATC MCT-09.
Marked area of this MF is 7219 sqm Till the accident day about 930 sqm of the task has been
cleared and 33 PMNs have been detected. On second day of team work in this MF a PMN
mine detonated on a local’s goat.
Description of the incident/accident:
On 22 August 2006 at 1105 hrs a PMN mine detonated on [the Victim] deminer of party 10,
section -04 of ATC MCT-09 while he was working in the site stepped on the mine. At the
same day the deminer has detected a PMN mine at 10:05 am, after marking of the mine by
mine marker the deminer has continued to work and around 11:00 the same deminer
detected another PMN mine as he marked this mine by a small marker. After detecting this
mine the relevant section leader called him to stop operation and come out from the work site.
(Normally teams are destroying the discovered mines/UXO during end hour of their daily
operation). After this announcement he collected the last lane rope and then started marking
of the site. The section leader insisted on deminer [the Victim] to leave site urgently. While he
was turning back he stepped on the detected mine, as mine detonated on him resulting his
right leg amputation and receiving multiple injuries on his body especially on his left hand.
This accident happened at 11:05. In 10 minutes medical first aid was applied on the patient,
at 11:17 the patient made ready for shifting to the hospital, the distance of the worksite to the
designated hospital was about 23 km, taking the patient from site to the hospital took 30
minutes. The patient was admitted to the Shahr-i-Now Emergency Hospital, the patient health
condition for the time being is satisfactory.

[The victim with amputated right leg and injured left leg and left hand.]
Site conditions: The terrain was hillside. The ground was soft. The weather was clear, calm
and warm. There was no or light vegetation.
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[The accident site was very open and relatively flat.]
Team and task details: The team had been at the site for six days. Working hours were from
0600 hrs to 1200 hrs. The deminers had a break each 30 minutes, but in the accident day the
party changed two times in 5 hours of work. Detector in use: MIL-D1. Hand-tool: bayonet. The
Victim was not dressed with PPE when the accident happened. The last leave was from 28
July 2006 to 07 August 2006. Salary for the men has not been paid on time.
Medical reaction time: The paramedic was at the accident site by 11:06. The Victim was
treated until 11:17, The victim was driven 23 Km to hospital from 11:17 to 11:47. Total
CASEVAC time 42 minutes. Last time a CASEVAC drill was done: On 10th July 2006 at TV
hill at Kartai Sakhi when the team was working in another task.
Conclusion
1. The victim has detected a PMN mine at 10:05 and marked it by mine marker then
continued to work till detecting the second mine at 10:55. As soon as the deminer found the
second mine, marked it by a small marker. Then according to the order of the relevant section
leader the deminer stopped his clearance activity and started to collect the lane rope and then
start to marking of the lane, at the last stage of marking section leader again called him to
hurry in his work as at this time the accident happened.
2. In about 5 hours work in the site two times the party has been changed; whereas, the
parties should be changed after each 30 minuets work.
3. The party has marked the second detected mine with a small marker as it was not properly
visible. Since the mine marker was not properly visible and he was in hurry, during marking of
lane the deminer has stepped on the mine.
4. When the deminer was busy in marking the relevant section leader has called the deminer
to hurry on his work, the voice has drawn the deminer attention and concentration to other
side, since at this time he was too near to the detected mine he mistakenly steps on the mine
and the accident occurs.
5. The deminer has detected the first mine at 10:05 am and the second at 10:55 am it shows
that the deminer has worked for a long time without break and refreshment, this had made the
deminer too tired as it was the other cause that he stepped on the mine.
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6. From the statements of the team command group it was extracted, that the team command
and control was too poor as there was no one to control the deminer work. Team leader.
assist team leader and the relevant section leader confessed in their statement that we were
busy in other places while the accident happened, which shows lack of command and control
and coordination among them, however this party was working on the mine belt and needed
more attention.
7. Team leader, assist team leader and the section leader and the victim deminer partner in
their statements ascertained that we do not know how and why the accident occurred. This
shows either they are reluctant to their work or they have reached to an agreement to say the
same points and intentionally hide the facts.
8. As we checked demining kits of the team parties, most of the parties had just one mine
marker in their demining kits, so. if the parties found more then one mine there would not
remain another mine marker with the party to mark the second detected mine therefore they
mark the second detected mine either with stones or other unfamiliar thing which are not
easily distinguishable and visible for the team members.
9. After two days from occurrence of the accident our QM1T-12 quality checked the area that
the party had cleared at the accident day, they found more than four signals in a specified
cleared area this shows that internal quality control was not properly conducted by the team
command group.
10. The team had not correct recording system. Team leader of the team had not recorded
the daily explosives expenditure of team when we compared the explosive expenditure
records of the assist team leader with the relevant section leader we saw that there is great
difference in their records. These records were important for the investigation team in finding
some facts regarding the accident.
11. As we checked the accident site we saw some evidences of excavated signals near the
accident point in un-cleared area which were refilled by soils this shows that the party was in
hurry to clear a small un-cleared area near located adjacent to the accident point, till end of
operation
12. In the accident initial report, signed by ATC relevant field officer, the accident has
occurred when the party was working in the site which opposes assertions of the team
command group that the accident has occurred after ceasing the party activity in the site.
13. As we checked the team records, we saw that the NGO internal QA cell did not conduct
internal QA/QC as it is required.
From the facts that have been mentioned in article 5, 9, and 11, we can extract that this
accident was a missed mine accident.

Recommendations
1. The NGO should improve its Internal QA/QC system. Just by establishing an effective and
efficient Internal QA/QC system we can improve the quality of the work and enhance work
productivity thus the team command group should conduct internal QC of the cleared area on
a daily basis and in accordance with set procedure and the NGO internal QA/QC cell should
regularly visit teams in their worksites and ensure that they are working in accordance with
the SOP.
2. The team command group should not force the deminers to hurry up in their work, but they
should strictly control the deminers to work in accordance with procedure.
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3. One mine marker is not enough for one party; the NGO should issue for each party three
mine markers.
4. Team command group should have coordination among them and control deminers with
full responsibility, section leaders should control his relevant parties and team leader control
two section of the team and as well the assist team leader .
5. The NGO and the team command group should be cooperative with the investigation team
in finding the facts as we saw the NGO internal QA cell intentionally further complicated the
matter for the investigation team in hiding the facts and changing the original shape of the
accident point.
6. The team recording system does not meet the requirements, it should be improved.
7. The team command group should strictly control the team deminers and take the
responsibility of the deminers work.
8. The team command group should not force the deminers to work for a long time in the site.
The deminers should work in turn and have break for rest periodically. Working one deminer
for long time creates such unprecedented situation.
Attachments: [Held on file]
Statements by Injured Members Statements by Witnesses Statements from Dr. at Hospital
Sketch Plan of Incident Site Photographs of Injuries
Injury data sheet(s) Photographs of the Site
Copy of Survey Map
Copy of Incident Report
Copy of Accident Report
Copy of Medical Report
Copy of Injury Card
Technical Details of Device

Initial letter from demining agency
Date: 22.08.2006
File No 24
To: KABUL AREA MANAGER
From: FIELD OFFICER FIELD OFFICE A
Subject: DEMINING ACCIDENT REPORT
1- ATC, Field office A MCT —09
2- Location Province Kabul District Ward 12 Village Puli Charkhi
MCPA task No AF-01-0101-012-709
3- DATE 22.08.2006 TIME 11:05 AM
4- [Name removed Deminer Team No 09
5- Amputation of RT leg also RT hand and left leg got injured
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6- First AID done then moved to hospital
7- Casualty was stable.
8- Casualty priority No 1
9 – The incident occurred in Mine Field During Clearance.
10 – 23km from task to hospital.
11- A- the causality occurred in Surveyed area.
B- AP ( PMN)
Signed.

From IMSMA forms
Victim DoB: 1986
Sketch shows right lower leg amputation: other injuries to upper limbs and lower limbs.

Follow up letter
File: OPS/03/01-14
Date: October 29, 2006
To: See distribution list
From: Chief of Operations and Deputy Programme Manager UNMACA, Kabul

Subject: Follow up action on demining accident happened to the deminer of ATC in task #
709 in Pulicharkhi village, Ward 12 of Kabul city
Reference: Demining investigation report File: OPS-27/412-06 dated: September 28, 2006, of
UN-AMAC Kabul.
A demining accident happened on August 22, 2006 in clearance lane of [the Victim] the
deminer of MCT-09 of ATC in task # 709 of Pulicharkhi village, Ward # 12 of Kabul city,
causing right leg amputation and multiple injuries to the deminer’s body.
The investigation report concluded that, the accident occurred because of poor supervision
and control by command group and carelessness on behalf of the injured deminer, as he
discovered a PMN mine on 10:05 and marked it with a mine marker (as the area located
close to the main road, therefore they have been conducting demolition at the end of daily
work) and then he discovered second PMN mine on 11:00 and marked this one with a mark
reader because of lack of second mine marker in the party and due to the instruction of
section leader he stopped further detection and started to mark his cleared lane while he was
not equipped with PPE, stepped on discovered mine and the accident occurred. The
investigation report further added that, the parties were changed just for one term in 5 hrs and
also when the clearance lane checked by investigation team, they found four signal in a small
area, during checking the documents the investing team found a great difference between the
explosive records of assistant team leader and section leader.
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Recommendations:
I. The team command group especially section leaders should not force deminers to hurry up
in their work, but should strictly control deminers during clearance operation in order to
ensure the implementation of SOPs.
II. The command group should keep a closed coordination among them and keep a proper
record of their activities and conduct the QC on proper basis.
III. The command group should be cooperative with investigation team to reveal the facts, as
the aim of investigation is to share the issue with all to prevent field staff from further
accidents.
IV. The ATC should improve their QA/QC system to ensure the quality of work.
V. Refresher training should be held for the team members.
Distribution List
With attachment: AMACs (5), Sub AMAC Gardez and Director ATC
Less attachment: [All demining groups in-country]

Victim Report
Victim number: 721

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 20

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 42 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Body
minor Hand
minor Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.
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STATEMENTS
Statement and Witness Report 1: the Victim
Q1. Please explain how the accident occurred?
A1: I detected the first mine around 10:00 am and marked it by mine marker then I continued
my work as usual. In the accident lane I found the second mine and marked it by a small mine
marker. At this time our section called work cease. As I collected the lane ropes and placed at
cleared area then in accordance to the section leader instruction I started marking of the lane
and reached to the detected mine. The section leader again voiced hurry up and withdraw
from the site and drink your tea since a mission will come at this time I turned my face as the
accident occurred. At this time my partner according to the section leader instruction was
busy for picking of the cleared area bushes.
Q2. How many mine markers you had in your part mine kit?
A2. We had two mine markers in our demining kit, one big and one small.
Q3. Were you dressed with PPE while the accident occurred?
A3. Till finding the second mine I was dressed with PPE, but during marking of the lane I was
without PPE.
Q4. Whether your section leader had told you to hurry in work?
A4. No.
Q5. In a part of un-cleared area near the barbed wires were some signs of excavation, had
you worked on it?
A5. I have not worked at that side. My partner may has worked at that place, I am not aware
of that.
Q6. After the accident our QM IT-12 quality controlled your cleared area near the accident
point and found some missed signals, would you please clarify the reasons?
A6. The reason is low voltage of my detector batteries.
Q7. Whether your section leader quality controlled your cleared areas on a daily basis?
A7. One day ago, the team leader had checked, but in my turn the section leader has not
checked.
Q8. Would you please explain the cause of the accident?
A8. During the hot weather the work period should be short; hurry in work is not good. From
work commence to accident time just two times the parties changed. The parties should be
changed after each 30 minutes.

Statement and Witness Report 2: Team leader
Q1. Please explain how the accident occurred?
A1. I was controlling parties of section one, while I heard the voice of explosion. I was about
300 meters far from the accident point. My assistant [Name removed] was controlling the
parties of section two and four. The accident happened at 11:05 am.
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Q2. How much is the size of your task, when your team started clearance of this task, how
many working days you have expended in this task, how many mines your team has detected
in this task and how much area of the site has been cleared by your team till now?
A2. On 15 Aug 2006. Clearance of the task was started and the task size is 7219 sqm. About
930 sqm and 33 PMN been detected in this area so far and we have worked for 6 days in this
task.
Q3. In your opinion which mistake of the de-miner has caused the accident?
3. In my opinion the deminer mistake caused the accident. The detonated mine was
discovered by the victim [Name removed]. The assist team leader was informed from
detection of the mine by the relevant section leader through VHF radio. Hearing the accident
voice, I instructed the team assistant to stop the party work. The section leader according to
our instruction had pulled out the party from worksite to cleared area. I think that the deminer
has gone again to the party worksite for taking any forgotten thing and on his return has
stepped on his detected mine so it was the mistake of the victim that stepped on his own
detected mine.

Statement and Witness Report 3: Medic
Questions:
1. Please explain all the steps of Medical First Aid that you applied on the patient?
2. Which parts of the victim body has received injuries?
3. How much is the distance of your worksite to Shahri Now Emergency Hospital and how
much time took his shifting to the hospital?
4. Where is the patient now and how is his health condition?
Answers:
1. Hearing the voice of the explosion at 11:05 am, I moved toward the accident point and
shifted the patient by stretcher to FMU for applying medical first aid. Applying all steps of first
aid on the patient, he made ready for shifting to the hospital in about 5 minutes and was
shifted to Shahri Now Emergency Hospital.
2. The patient right leg had amputation and his left hand had injuries.
3. The distance between our worksite to the Emergency Hospital is about 15 kilometres and
his shifting to the hospital took about 40 minutes.
4. The patient is in Shahri Now Emergency Hospital and his health condition is satisfactory.

Statement and Witness Report 4: Assistant Team Leader
Questions:
Q1. Please explain how the accident occurred?
A1. About 10:50 am the relevant section leader informed me that deminer [the Victim] has
detected a mine. I instructed him to properly mark it and stop the party activity. Then I moved
toward party one of section-2, at this time I heard the voice of accident and moved toward the
accident area to assist the team nurse in applying medical first aid. After applying medical first
aid team leader accompanied the victim transfer to the hospital and I handled demolition of
the remaining detected mines.
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Q2. As you said the mine was detected at 10:50 and detonated at 11:05. what was doing the
de-miner doing at this 15 minutes interval?
A2. At that time I was busy in control of section-02, the activity of the party on which the
accident happened and the party was busy in collecting demining tools as the accident
occurred; further information is with relevant section leader and the victim.
Q3. Whether you stopped the work of all team at 10:50 am or just stopped activity of the
accident involved party?
A3. I only stopped work of the victim party which was working on the mine belt.

Statement and Witness Report 5: Section Leader
Q1. Please explain how the accident occurred?
A1. When deminer [the Victim] declared detection of mine, I moved from my control point
toward the detected mine and saw that the mine is PMN. I told him to mark the mine then
informed team assistant, team assistant advised to mark the site and cease the work of the
related party, according to the assist TL order I instructed the party members to collect their
demining tools and leave the worksite then I moved toward other party for announcing work
cease at this time I heard the voice of mine detonation.
Q2. Please specify why the accident happened?
A2. I pulled the party out of worksite. May he has returned to the worksite for taking any
forgotten personal or demining tool without my permission.
Q3. Where the accident happened at cleared or un-cleared area?
A3. The deminer may has entered mistakenly to un-cleared area for taking the forgotten thing.
Q4. Whether the detonated mine was detected or a missed mine?
A4. I ordered the party deminers to cease the work, collect their tools and leave the worksite
then I moved toward another party, at this time the deminer may mistakenly has entered uncleared area as the accident happened?
Q5. How old the victim was and how long he has worked as deminer and whether you had
confidence on his work experience or not?
A5. He is about 20 or 21 years old and it is about two years that he is working as deminer in
this team. Yes he had good demining experience.

Statement and Witness Report 6: partner deminer
1. Please explain how the accident happened?
2. Which mistake of the deminer caused the accident?
3. Whether the area on which the accident occurred was cleared or not, if was cleared then
why the accident occurred there?
4. How many mines your party detected in this area and what was their type?
Answers:
1. I was setting in the rest area as [the Victim] called mine, the section leader approached to
him and the mine was marked and the demining tools was shifted to safe area, section leader

11

called me to assist in collecting the de-mining tools as soon as I wanted to shift the tools, the
accident happened.
2. I was apart from him, I did not know how the accident occurred, I think he had forgotten
some thing in the site and had come for its taking as the accident occurred.
3. The mine was detected and marked, but was not disposed of.
4. Two mines have been detected by our party in this area.

Analysis
The investigators decided that this was a “Missed mine” accident but do not explain why and
were a little inconsistent in their conclusions. However, it is classed as a “Missed-mine”
accident in deference to their opinion.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the field
controls were entirely inadequate. The Victim was allowed into a minefield without PPE and
was ordered to hurry up repeatedly. The field supervisors denied responsibility and were not
co-operative with the investigators.
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the managers
of the demining agency are responsible for the selection training and quality performance of
their field supervisors.
The investigators did not check the Victim’s claim that his metal-detector did not work
properly. This is the second investigation in which this claim has been made. All metal
detectors need to be reset as the temperature rises during a day, and some become
unreliable when the temperature becomes too high. It is possible that the detector training
provided by the demining agency was not comprehensive.
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